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INTRODUCTION
More than a decade ago, the Bureau of Prisons (“the Bureau”) secretly
created the first of two Communication Management Units (“CMUs”) in
Terre Haute, Indiana, and transferred seventeen federal prisoners there—
fifteen of whom were Muslim.1 The units’ purpose is to limit inmates’
communications by prohibiting all physical contact with visitors and monitoring the content and duration of all phone calls and other forms of communication, including letters and in-person visits.2 Since the units came into being, civil liberties advocates have criticized the procedural mechanisms
used to create the CMUs, the process for designating prisoners to CMUs,
and the conditions imposed on those prisoners.3
News outlets have given the units nicknames including “Guantánamo
North”4 and “Little Gitmo,”5 because like Guantánamo6 detainees CMU
inmates are mostly Arab or Muslim men believed to be low-level terrorists
or to have terrorist associations.7 As of 2011, between 66 and 72% of
CMU inmates were Muslim.8
The communications restrictions imposed on CMU inmates are dramatically different from those imposed on inmates in general population units.
The Center for Constitutional Rights—which represents several CMU in1
2
3

4

5

6
7
8

David M. Shapiro, How Terror Transformed Federal Prison: Communication Management Units, 44
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 47, 50 (2012).
See infra Section I.
American Civil Liberties Union et al., Comment on Proposed Rule Limited Communication for
Terrorist Inmates, 71 Fed. Reg. 16520 (June 2, 2006) [hereinafter ACLU Comments],
https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/limitedcommunications20060605.pdf.
Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, ‘Guantanamo North’: Inside Secretive U.S. Prisons, NPR (Mar. 3,
2011, 1:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/2011/03/03/134168714/guantanamo-north-inside-u-ssecretive-prisons [hereinafter Johnson & Williams, Inside Guantanamo North].
Matt Sledge, Judge Rules Against Prisoners in ‘Little Guantanamo’ Lawsuit, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar.
16,
2015,
6:42
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/16/prisoners-littleguantanamo_n_6881774.html; Christopher S. Stewart, ‘Little Gitmo’, N.Y. MAG. (July 10, 2011),
http://nymag.com/news/features/yassin-aref-2011-7/.
Andrei Scheinkman et al., The Guantánamo Docket, N.Y. TIMES (last updated Feb. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/guantanamo.
Alia
Malek,
Gitmo
in
the
Heartland,
THE
NATION
(Mar.
10,
2011),
https://www.thenation.com/article/gitmo-heartland/.
Johnson & Williams, Inside Guantanamo North, supra note 4.
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mates and remains in ongoing litigation over the units9—describes them as
“the federal prison system’s experiment in social isolation.”10 Indeed, CMUs
radically restrict inmates’ ability to maintain contact with their families. Yet
CMUs are not unique within the federal prison system in terms of imposing
isolation.11 Varying forms of restrictive housing exist within the federal prison system, including solitary confinement, where prisoners are held alone in
single cells for up to 23 hours per day.12 So, although CMU conditions are
not the most isolative along the spectrum of restrictive settings, the communications restrictions they impose are among the most extreme. And most
CMU inmates are classified as medium- and low-security offenders; many
have no disciplinary infractions nor do they have violent histories.13
On January 22, 2015, the Bureau finalized regulations establishing and
describing CMU operation.14 The Final Rule was a near replication of its
proposed precursors, permitting CMU staff to monitor “all communications
between inmates . . . and persons in the community,” and explaining that
“[t]he ability to monitor such communication is necessary to ensure the safety,
security, and orderly operation of correctional facilities, and protection of the
public.”15 Officially, the eighty or so CMU inmates are classified as general
population inmates, though the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”)
reviewed CMUs alongside other segregated housing units because “CMU
inmates are separated from general inmate population and have . . . 100 percent of their communications monitored and noncontact visits.”16

9

10

11

12

13

14
15
16

See, e.g., Aref v. Lynch (Aref IV), 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding that prisoners had a Fifth
Amendment liberty interest in avoiding placement in a CMU and remanding to determine
whether process assigning inmates to CMUs was adequate).
CMUs: The Federal Prison System’s Experiment in Social Isolation, CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Mar. 31,
2010),
https://ccrjustice.org/home/get-involved/tools-resources/fact-sheets-and-faqs/cmusfederal-prison-system-s-experiment.
Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 256-57 (“All parties agree CMUs are less extreme in terms of deprivation
than administrative segregation. Inmates in administrative segregation must remain in their cells
for twenty-three hours a day; they are unable to hold jobs or access most educational opportunities. . . . By contrast, CMU inmates are allowed in common spaces with other CMU inmates for
sixteen hours a day. They have access to educational and professional opportunities . . . .”).
Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-429, BUREAU OF PRISONS:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF
IMPACT OF SEGREGATED HOUSING 2 (2013) [hereinafter GAO Report] (“As of February 2013,
BOP confined approximately 12,460 federal inmates–or about 7 percent of inmates in BOPoperated facilities–in segregated housing units.”).
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 84; see also Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself? Sentencing Young American Muslims in the War on Terror, 126 YALE L.J. 1520, 1566 (2017) (“Often, the application of these
measures fails to distinguish between hardened terrorists and individuals . . . whose convictions
are not tied to any act of violence or viable threat.”).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3168 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 540).
Id.
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 45.
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Despite political interest in prisons and criminal justice reform, and the
fact that CMUs implicate substantive legal doctrine and ongoing court
challenges, these units have garnered relatively little scholarly attention.17
This Article provides a factual background and context for the CMUs,
details the Final Rule promulgated in January 2015, and analyzes legal and
policy problems with the units’ continued employ and existence through
the lens of the most recent decision in the ongoing case, Aref v. Lynch.18 Part
I defines and describes the CMUs’ creation and conditions and profiles
some of the inmates who have challenged their designation to CMUs. Part
II analyzes how courts exercise deference to prison officials in prisoners’
rights cases, using the second district court decision in the Aref case as a
primary example. Part III examines recent outcomes in due process challenges to CMUs. Part IV assesses potential equal protection claims under
Ashcroft v. Iqbal19 and addresses some of the differences between Aref and
Johnson v. California.20 Part V explores how courts can and should take a
human rights oriented view of prison reform efforts. Throughout, Aref v.
Holder serves as an exemplar,21 demonstrating how different legal theories
have been considered in the CMU context.
Ultimately, this Article is about why prisoners, and especially CMU inmates, should be afforded greater procedural safeguards. It argues that political actors should pursue prison reform and that courts should consider
rights-based, substantive arguments in prisoners’ rights cases. This shift is
necessary in light of an evolving understanding of the impact of restrictive
17

18
19
20
21

CMUs have been thoroughly examined–and criticized–in only two articles. Shapiro, supra note
1, at 52 (arguing that “BOP’s operation of CMUs is greatly flawed, both legally and from the perspective of sound policy” and discussing potential improvements); Luke A. Beata, Note, Stateside
Guantanamo: Breaking the Silence, 62 SYRACUSE L. REV. 281 (2011) (providing an overview of the
CMUs’ creation and operation and arguing that as they currently exist, CMUs violate both constitutional and statutory standards).
Outside of these in-depth analyses, CMUs are mentioned in a few other articles. Ahmed,
supra note 13, at 1565–66; Sahar F. Aziz, Caught in a Preventive Dragnet: Selective Counterterrorism in a
Post-9/11 America, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 429, 454–56 (2012) (describing conditions of CMU confinement and asserting that CMUs continue disparate treatment of Muslims in the criminal justice system post conviction); Cyra Akila Choudhury, Shari’ah Law as National Security Threat?, 46
AKRON L. REV. 49, 107 (2013) (suggesting that CMUs are “used to segregate and isolate those
Muslims who are considered leaders . . . from the general population”); SpearIt, Muslim Radicalization in Prison: Responding with Sound Penal Policy or the Sound of Alarm?, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 37, 72
(2013) (asserting that CMUs may foster “solidarity and defiance” among inmates due to “heightening conflicts between guards and inmates”); Wadie E. Said, The Message and Means of the Modern
Terrorism Prosecution, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 175, 194 (2012) (characterizing the
CMUs as an extension of exceptionalism in terrorism prosecutions).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Aref v. Holder (Aref III), No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL
3749621 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015); Aref v. Holder (Aref II), 953 F. Supp. 2d. 133 (D.D.C. 2013);
Aref v. Holder (Aref I), 774 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D.D.C. 2011).
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conditions on prisoners, the Bureau’s professed intention to both rehabilitate and punish inmates, and the important goal of deterring future crime.
I. WHAT ARE COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT UNITS AND HOW DID
THEY COME TO EXIST?
The term Communication Management Unit officially refers to a federal
prison unit that holds “inmates who . . . require increased monitoring of
communications between the inmate and persons in the community to protect the safety, security, and orderly operation of the BOP and to protect the
public.”22 CMU inmates are often believed to have terrorist associations.23
A. Logistics: How Were the CMUs Created?
At present, the Bureau operates two CMUs, one at the U.S. Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois,24 and one at the Federal Correctional Complex in
Terre Haute, Indiana.25 Both are characterized as medium-security facilities with minimum-security satellite camps.26 Each CMU was initially created through the same opaque process.27 In April 2006, the Bureau proposed a new regulation—in the form of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(“Proposed Rule”)—which intended to limit terrorist inmates’ communications.28 Critics responded to the Proposed Rule by arguing that it was
broader than professed, gave prison officials too much discretion without
oversight, and would undermine both prisoners’ and the news media’s First

22

23

24
25

26
27
28

FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS 18 (2014) [hereinafter BOP LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE],
http://www.bop.gov/resources/pdfs/legal_guide.pdf.
Id. (going on to explain that “[i]nmates designated to the CMU may have been convicted of, or
associated with, terrorism or terrorist organization, repetitively attempted to contact their victims;
and/or attempted illegal activities through approved communication methods and/or received
extensive disciplinary action due to misuse of approved communicating methods”); see also Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3177.
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, USP MARION, http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mar/
(last visited May 30, 2017).
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42486 THE BUREAU OF PRISONS (BOP):
OPERATIONS AND BUDGET 8, 8 n.44 (2014) (noting that the Bureau of Prisons only operates
CMUs at two facilities, which are located at FCC Terre Haute and USP Marion); FED. BUREAU
OF PRISONS, FCI TERRE HAUTE, http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/tha/ (last visited
May 30, 2017).
FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, FCI TERRE HAUTE, supra note 25; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, USP
MARION, supra note 24.
See Malek, supra note 7 (calling the CMU at Terre Haute “a secret experimental unit for secondtier terrorism inmates”).
Limited Communication for Terrorist Inmates, 71 Fed. Reg. 16520 (proposed Apr. 3, 2006) (to
be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540).
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Amendment rights.29 The Bureau then appeared to abandon the rulemaking process.30 Seven months later, however, the CMU at Terre Haute was
established and seventeen inmates were transferred there. This was unusual: rather than engaging in the rulemaking process anew, the Bureau wrote
a policy document called an “Institution Supplement” to set up and govern
the units.31 Unlike rulemakings, such a policy document does not require a
notice-and-comment period prior to implementation.32
Professor William Luneberg33 articulated the issue surrounding the
2006 Proposed Rule this way: “It is not a normal thing for agencies legally
bound by the APA [Administrative Procedure Act] to propose some new
program, to start through the public rule-making process and then basically
not complete it, and then to decide to go ahead and do it on their own.”34
This is because the Administrative Procedure Act differentiates between
agency-promulgated rules based on whether or not they are “legislative
rules.”35 If an agency begins to engage in the notice-and-comment process,
it implies that the rule in question is legislative.36 To then quietly bypass
this process, as the Bureau did, is rare.37
In February 2007, two months after prisoners were transferred to Terre
Haute, news of the new unit entered the public sphere. First, a CMU inmate named Rafil Dhafir38 wrote a letter about his transfer and the new
29

30
31
32
33
34
35

36

37
38

ACLU Comments, supra note 3, at 2–3, 5–6. Besides the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”), signatories included the Legal Aid Society, and the National Lawyers Guild, among
others. Id. at 1.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 50.
Id.
Id. For more information on the unusual means employed by the Bureau to establish the two
CMUs, see id. at 49–51; Beata, supra note 17, at 286.
William V. Luneburg is a Professor Emeritus of Law at the University of Pittsburgh School of
Law.
Malek, supra note 7. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2015) (outlining rulemaking procedures for all agencies).
5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (noting that the process for proposed rulemakings does not apply to “interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or
practice”); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 69 (explaining the difference between legislative and nonlegislative rules and describing the procedures required to issue legislative rules).
An agency’s understanding—as illustrated by its actions or otherwise—is relevant because “[t]he
distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules or policy statements has been described at various times as ‘tenuous,’ ‘fuzzy,’ ‘blurred,’ and perhaps most picturesquely, ‘enshrouded in considerable smog.’” Shapiro, supra note 1, at 69 (quoting Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v.
Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
Malek, supra note 7 (calling the Bureau’s approach “‘grossly irregular’ and arguably illegal”).
Dr. Rafil Dhafir was an oncologist in upstate New York until he was arrested in 2003 and
charged with violating the International Emergency Economic Power Act, money laundering,
mail and wire fraud, tax evasion, visa fraud, and Medicare fraud. Katherine Hughes, Anatomy of a
“Terrorism” Prosecution: Dr. Rafil Dhafir and the Help the Needy Muslim Charity Case, 68 NAT’L LAW.
GUILD REV. 234, 234, 239 (2011). Most of these charges were related to a charity Dhafir ran
that sent food and medicine to Iraqi civilians. Id. at 234. Then-New York Governor George
Pataki “described the case as a ‘money laundering case to help terrorist organizations . . . conduct
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prison conditions, which was published on the blog of a court-watcher for
the American Civil Liberties Union who had followed Dhafir’s trial from
the beginning.39 Soon after, the Washington Post published an article briefly
describing the CMU at Terre Haute.40 Both writings documented communications restrictions reminiscent of those described in the 2006 Proposed Rule. All CMU inmate communications were monitored, phone
calls limited in number, and visits “restricted to a total of four hours per
month.”41 The 2006 Proposed Rule had recommended restricting “terrorist prisoners’”42 written communications to a single six-page letter per week
in correspondence with a single recipient, telephone communications to a
single fifteen-minute phone call per month, and in-person visiting to one
hour per month,43 and the actual restrictions imposed on prisoners in the
newly established CMU were only slightly less stringent.44
In 2008, the CMU at Marion was established, also by way of an “Institution Supplement.”45 Another Proposed Rule treating the CMUs was introduced and opened for public comment in April 2010,46 then reopened
for additional comment in March 2014.47 Finally, on January 22, 2015, the
Bureau promulgated the Final Rule formally establishing the CMUs.48
This step was significant because it precluded further lawsuits challenging
the Bureau’s failure to adhere to Administrative Procedure Act require-

39

40

41
42

43
44

45
46
47
48

horrible acts.’” Id. at 235. However, none of the charges against Dhafir were terrorism-related.
United States v. Dhafir, 577 F.3d 411, 412–13 (2d Cir. 2009).
Rafil Dhafir, A Letter from Dr. Dhafir About His Transfer and New Prison Situation, DHAFIRTRIAL (Feb.
7, 2007, 11:50 PM), http://www.dhafirtrial.net/2007/02/07/a-letter-from-dr-dhafir-about-histransfer-and-new-prison-situation/.
Dan Eggen, Facility Holding Terrorism Inmates Limits Communication, WASH. POST (Feb. 25, 2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/24/AR2007022401231_pf.html.
Id.
Legal scholars and practitioners have pointed out that what constitutes “terrorist activities” or
“an identifiable link to terrorist-related activities” in accordance with regulation 28 CFR
540.200(a) is ambiguous and subject to prison officials’ discretion. See, e.g., ACLU Comments, supra note 3, at 2 (advocating for withdrawal of the Proposed Rule because it violates the Constitution and lacks proper oversight).
Limited Communication for Terrorist Inmates, supra note 28, at 16524.
Eggen, supra note 40 (noting that all prisoners must speak in English, all mail and telephone calls
are monitored, inmate receive a limited number of phone calls, and prison visits are limited to
four hours per month at the at the CMU facilities in Terre Haute).
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 50–51.
Communication Management Units, 75 Fed. Reg. 17324 (proposed Apr. 6, 2010) (to be codified
at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540).
Communication Management Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 13263 (proposed Mar. 10, 2014) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 540).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168 (Jan 22, 2015) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. pt. 540); Christie Thompson, Another Kind of Isolation, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Jan. 28,
2015, 2:02 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/28/another-kind-of-isolation#.x6qufG19H (explaining that the CMUs “operated largely in secret, without any formal policies
or procedures in place—until last week.”).
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ments.49 Before promulgation of the Final Rule, that failure provided fodder for several lawsuits,50 but these claims became moot because the Bureau
ultimately completed the rulemaking process.51 Nevertheless, other claims
against CMUs remain.52
B. Confinement Criteria: Who Is Designated to CMUs and How?
The Final Rule provides explicit designation criteria and procedures for
transferring inmates to CMUs.53 These require the Bureau’s Assistant Director of the Correctional Program Division to review “substantiated/credible evidence of a potential threat to” prison security or the public
and conclude that the “inmate’s designation to a CMU is necessary.”54
“Upon arrival at the designated CMU,” the facility’s warden will provide
the inmate with written notice that details the communication restrictions
and informs the inmate that the designation is not punitive.55 The notice
also explains why the inmate has been designated to the CMU, unless the
Assistant Director feels that providing an explanation would be dangerous.56 Finally, the notice informs inmates that designation will be “reviewed regularly by the inmate’s Unit Team” and may be challenged
through the Bureau’s administrative remedy program.57
Criteria for designation to a CMU are broad,58 but even before the Final Rule was promulgated, CMUs were known, albeit more informally, to
49
50

51
52

53
54
55
56
57
58

Administrative Procedure Act, 5. U.S.C. § 553 (2015).
See, e.g., Royer v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 934 F. Supp. 2d 92, 99 (D.D.C. 2013) (denying a motion to dismiss because the court could not “conclude that notice-and-comment rulemaking was
not required”); Nosair v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 13-CV-1017-MJR, 2013 WL 5835733, at
*4 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2013) (finding that the plaintiff was entitled to further review with respect to
the Bureau’s violation of the APA in the creation of the CMUs).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 171 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing the plaintiffs’ APA claim as moot because defendants had re-engaged with the rulemaking process).
See, e.g., Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015) (listing various claims plaintiffs brought in relation to their transfer to CMUs); Miller v. Walton, No. 3:15-cv00533-NJR, 2015 WL 2330478, at *1 (S.D. Ill. May 14, 2015) (noting that the plaintiff brought a
number of claims in relation to his detention in a CMU); Amawi v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 13cv-536-JPG-DGW, 2014 WL 1389278, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2014) (dismissing Freedom of Information Acti claim brought against CMU); Nosair, 2013 WL 5835733, at *1 (listing various
claims inmate brought in relation to his detention in a CMU).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3177–78.
Id. at 3178.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 61 (describing the Administrative Remedy Program as a written process inmates use to submit complaints and appeal rejections).
Alexis Agathocleous, ‘New’ Rules for the BOP’s Experiment in Social Isolation, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
29, 2015, 3:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/the-center-for-constitutional-rights/newrules-for-the-bops-ex_b_6574136.html (“Documents unearthed by CCR [Center for Constitutional Rights] reveal that when prisoners are told why they have been sent to a CMU, these explanations are vague, incomplete, inaccurate, and sometimes even false.”).
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house terrorists.59 Under the Final Rule, CMU designation is permitted if
evidence exists that the “inmate’s current offense(s) of conviction, or offense
conduct, included association, communication, or involvement, related to
international or domestic terrorism.”60 In some known cases, an association with terrorism has been cited where none was proven.61 For example,
Avon Twitty, a plaintiff in Aref v. Holder (“Aref I”),62 was a Muslim convert in
prison for a murder he committed in 1982.63 He spent three years in the
CMU at Terre Haute before being released to a halfway house in 2010.64
When he appealed his transfer to the CMU, the Bureau responded that
Twitty was “a ‘member of an international terrorist organization,’ though
no organization was named and there appears to be no public evidence for
the assertion.”65 Twitty’s claims for relief have since been dismissed because he is no longer in the Bureau’s custody.66 Other inmates’ alleged terrorist associations are similarly attenuated.67
In many cases, however, CMU inmates actually were convicted of terrorism-related charges.68 Nevertheless, an investigation conducted by National Public Radio (“NPR”) in 2011 suggests that even these inmates are
unlikely to be deemed dangerous.69 Consider, for example, Sabri
Benkahla, one of the first plaintiffs to challenge CMU operations. In 2004,
Benkahla was charged with “supplying services to the Taliban and using a

59

60

61

62
63
64
65
66
67

68

69

BOP LEGAL RESOURCE GUIDE, supra note 22, at 18; Thompson, supra note 48 (describing the
“new restrictive units” as being “for terrorists or other inmates [the Bureau] feared might coordinate crimes from behind bars”).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3177; see also Ahmed, supra note 13, at
1528–31 (discussing application of the Terrorism Enhancement to nonviolent defendants who
committed crimes involving conduct less directly threatening to U.S. interests).
Scott Shane, Beyond Guantanamo, a Web of Prisons for Terrorism Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/us/beyond-guantanamo-bay-a-web-of-federalprisons.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all&# (referencing Avon Twitty’s case); see also Shapiro, supra
note 1, at 84 (mentioning a case in which the prisoner was sent to a CMU despite having no disciplinary record).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 153 (D.D.C. 2011).
Shane, supra note 61.
Johnson & Williams, Inside Guantanamo North, supra note 4.
Shane, supra note 61.
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 161.
Carrie Johnson & Margot Williams, Leaving ‘Guantanamo North’, NPR (Mar. 4, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/03/04/134176614/leaving-guantanamo-north [hereinafter Johnson
& Williams, Leaving] (describing Enaam Arnaout, “who pleaded guilty to racketeering for allegedly misleading donors to his charity about where their money was going”); Malek, supra note 7 (describing Rafil Dhafir, who has “had no terrorism convictions or charges”).
Margot Williams & Carrie Johnson, Five More High-Profile Inmates Sent to ‘Guantanamo North’ Prison
Units, NPR (Sept. 29, 2011, 11:40 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2011/09/29/140919617/five-more-high-profile-inmates-sent-to-guantanamo-north-prisonunits [hereinafter Williams & Johnson, Five More] (describing CMUs as housing a “high percentage of inmates convicted of terrorism-related charges”).
Johnson & Williams, Leaving, supra note 67.
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firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence” and was acquitted.70 The
government remained convinced, however, that Benkahla had attended a
jihadist training camp and subpoenaed him to testify before two grand juries on this subject only a few weeks after his acquittal.71 Based on this testimony and the answers he gave to FBI investigators, he was charged in
2006 with making false declarations to two grand juries and the FBI and
with “obstructing justice on account of the false declarations.”72 Following
his conviction, “his sentencing judge . . . declared unequivocally that ‘Sabri
Benkahla is not a terrorist,’ . . . and stated that the chances of Benkahla ever committing another crime were ‘infinitesimal.’”73 He was transferred to
a CMU in 2007.74 His Notice of Transfer explained, “Your offense conduct included significant communication with and support to Lashkar-eTaiba, an identified foreign terrorist organization, which is committed to
engaging in violence and terrorist activity against the United States and its
allies.”75 Benkala tried to challenge his designation, but when the Bureau
transferred him out of the CMU, he voluntarily dismissed the case.76 At
bottom, it appears that Benkahla was “sent to a CMU despite a clean disciplinary record in prison and a judicial finding that he was not a terrorist,”77
ultimately suggesting that—at least as to Benkahla—the Bureau wasted resources and imposed a needlessly restrictive environment, not to mention
the potential infringement of his rights.
In addition to the first criterion permitting CMU designation for a terrorist association, inmates may be designated to a CMU if “any other substantiated/credible evidence” exists that the inmate’s communication with “persons in the community” might result in “a potential threat to the safe, secure,
and orderly operation of prison facilities, or protection of the public.”78
Some have characterized this as a “catchall provision,” evincing a “remarkably low bar.”79 In response to criticism that overly broad designation criteria
results in discrimination or retaliation against politically active minorities, the
70
71
72
73

74
75
76
77
78
79

United States v. Benkahla, 530 F.3d 300, 303–04, 306 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that Benkahla was
believed to be a part of the quasi-military “Dar al-Arqam paintball group”).
Id. at 304.
Id. at 305.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 84; ACLU, Benkhala v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, et al. (quoting Benkahla, 530
F.3d at 306), https://www.aclu.org/cases/benkahla-v-federal-bureau-prisons-et-al (last updated
June 2, 2010).
Dean Kuipers, ACLU Suit to Challenge Isolation Prisons, L.A. TIMES (June 18, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/18/nation/na-terror18.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 83 (citing Exhibit C to Amended Complaint, Benkahla v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, No. 2:09-CV-00025 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2009)).
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 52.
Id. at 84 (quotation marks omitted).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3178 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540).
Shapiro, supra note 1, 87 (noting that the “vagueness of the contemplated harm places no meaningful limit on prison officials’ discretion to deem an inmate a ‘threat.’”).
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Bureau wrote that inmates are provided with “an explanation of the decision
in sufficient detail, unless providing specific information would jeopardize the
safety . . . or orderly operation of the facility.”80 This response fails to engage
with the substance of critics’ concerns about imprecise criteria and deficient
oversight in the designation decision-making process.81
Understanding the CMUs is easier with a few examples. A number of
CMU inmates have been described at length by the news media. New York
Magazine profiled Yassin Aref, for whom the Aref cases are named, in a
nearly 5,000-word article chronicling how the FBI targeted him in a controversial sting operation, as well as his ensuing arrest, conviction, and
eventual designation to the CMU at Terre Haute.82 Aref and his family
came to the United States as refugees fleeing the Saddam Hussein regime.83
When the FBI arrested him in Albany, New York, he had served as a local
imam for almost four years.84 Following a three-week trial, Aref was “sentenced to a fifteen-year term for money laundering, providing material support for terrorism, conspiracy, and making a false statement to the FBI.”85
As the New York Times described his crime, “he agreed to serve as witness to
a loan between an acquaintance and another man, actually an informant
posing as a supporter of a Pakistani terrorist group, Jaish-e-Muhammad.”86
Witnessing loans is a traditional part of Islamic culture.87
Prosecutors insisted that Aref knew the loan would be used to buy a
“shoulder-firing missile launcher” to kill a Pakistani official, though after he
was sentenced, the Assistant U.S. Attorney prosecuting the case commented,
“Did [Aref] actually engage in terrorist acts? . . . Well, we didn’t have the
evidence of that. But he had the ideology.”88 Others have characterized his
involvement as “peripheral.”89 The judge recommended that he be incarcerated locally.90 In spring 2007, after a series of transfers, Aref found himself in the Terre Haute CMU.91 Aref had four young children at the time,

80
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Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3169.
ACLU Comments, supra note 3, at 5–6.
Stewart, supra note 5.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 84 n.178.
Stewart, supra note 5.
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015).
Shane, supra note 61.
Stewart, supra note 5 (noting that “as the only imam in Albany, Aref had notarized many loans”).
Id.; see also Ahmed, supra note 13, at 1548–49 (“What is clear is that ‘ideology alone—even endorsement of terrorist activity—is such a poor predictor of actual terrorist activity that [it] is almost worthless.’”) (quoting Jesse J. Norris, Entrapment and Terrorism on the Left: An Analysis of Post 911 Cases, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 236, 269 n.206 (2016)).
Shane, supra note 61.
Stewart, supra note 5.
Id.
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including a daughter who was newborn when he was convicted.92 Terre
Haute is nearly 1,000 miles from the family’s home in Albany and, during
“the first two years of Aref’s imprisonment, his family was only able to visit
four times . . . [and] only allowed to have one four-hour visit per month.”93
The other inmate plaintiff remaining in the Aref case is Kifah Jayyousi,
who “was sentenced to a twelve-year and eight-month term for conspiracy
to murder, kidnap, and maim in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide material support to terrorism.”94 In June 2008, about nine months into Jayyousi’s sentence, the Chief of the Bureau’s Counter-Terrorism Unit
recommended he be designated to a CMU, and Jayyousi was transferred to
the Terre Haute CMU.95 Later that year, in October 2008, Jayyousi was
serving as a rotational Muslim prayer leader and gave a sermon96 for which
92

93
94
95

96

Annie P. Waldman, Inside the Kafkaesque World of the US’s ‘Little Guantánamos’, VICE (Mar. 20, 2014,
5:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/inside-the-kafkaesque-world-of-the-uss-littleguantanamos.
Id.
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015).
Aref II, 953 F. Supp. 2d. 133, 139 (D.D.C. 2013) (including Jayyousi’s Notice of Transfer, which
read, “Your current offenses of conviction are for Conspiracy to Commit Murder [listing convictions] . . . You acted in a criminal conspiracy to raise money to support mujahideen operations
and used religious training to recruit other individuals in furtherance of criminal acts in this country as well as many countries abroad. Your offense conduct included significant communication,
association and assistance to al-Qaida, a group which has been designated as a foreign terrorist
organization”).
An excerpt of the sermon as included in the Aref II opinion:
“My brothers in this place, as you are aware this concentrated Muslim community, this
Muslim community is a Prison and is not a prison. . . . This is a very unique prison and
even BOP employees and some of the CO’s and some of the Officers wonder where did
this place come from. It’s like a place that fell from some hell, some evil created this place
because it does not belong to anything that BOP has done in the past 300 year history
and you know what is happening here. . . . [E]ach one of you have been brought[,]
whether your case was started with a fabrication or the reason that brought you here was
the fabricator[, y]ou were brought here because you are Muslim and we have our response to that, has to be to stand firm, stand strong, to stand steadfast. . . . [T]hey turned
a few[] good American citizens into [criminals]. . . . [Y]ou are not the target, I am not the
target, it is not U.S. vs. Jayyousi, it is U.S. vs. [I]slam. . . . John McCain is a presidential
can[d]idate and in two months he could be our president where was he 20 years ago? He
was being to[rtu]red in a Vietnamese prison for many years with no hope . . . [H]e stood
fast he stayed firm he came through[. I]f the people of (Minion?) are doing this shouldn’t
we as beli[e]vers do the same. There is a famous story of . . . Nelson Mandel[]a . . . [S]omeone comes [with] an offer to you; oh you will get out but hey we would
like to . . . ask you to help us get more people into the CMU[,] entrap more Muslims and
get them in jail; tarnish the image of Islam in America. Mandel[]a refused
them. . . . There was another story of Admiral Jim Scotsdale. . . . Admir[a]l Jim Scotsdale
was the highest ranking U.S. officer to be Captain in Vietnam[;] he was shot down. He
was a three star General and they tortured him for eight years. . . . [H]e said that if you
want to survive a very bad situ[]ation like that and we are not being tortured here except
psychologically but if you want to survive he said retain faith that you will prevail at the
end. It is hard but it is the way which Allah created us. . . . [Y]ou are going to return to
your lord to meet him with your hard work and the hardships that you have faced and
done in this life; this is why we mart[y]r. . . .[Y]ou have to brave this life you have to face
this life and remember that no matter what happens to us . . . [it] is what Allah has preordained . . . .”
Id. at 139–40 (alterations in original).
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he was charged with a disciplinary infraction that was later dismissed and
expunged from his record.97 In October 2010, Jayyousi was transferred to
the Marion CMU and in February 2011, “the Marion CMU Unit Manager wrote a memorandum requesting that Jayyousi be transferred out of the
CMU.”98 The Counter-Terrorism Unit Chief opposed that recommendation on the basis of the sermon, which he characterized as “aimed at inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population.”99 As a result, Jayyousi
“remained in the CMU until May 2013, when he was transferred to the
general prison population.”100 Jayyousi spent more than five and a half
years in the CMUs. He has five children. His wife described their visits,
explaining, “we need to hold the phone in our hands . . . You can’t hear
him. [His daughters] can’t touch him.”101
C. Conditions of Confinement: How Have Communications Been Limited?
Due to the promulgation of the Final Rule, some details of the restrictions are more certain and transparent than they were before. All visits
must be non-contact, and prison wardens may limit various aspects of the
visit.102 According to their Institution Supplements, neither CMU is quite
as restrictive in practice as the Final Rule would permit.103 In practice, they
permit only non-contact visits for a maximum of eight hours per month
(although this could be reduced to four hours), with any single visit lasting
up to a maximum of four hours.104 Unless prior arrangements are made,
all visits must be conducted in English and each inmate may have only four
visitors in the visiting room at any time.105 Visits must also be pre-approved
and scheduled at least one week in advance, and must occur during visiting
hours—Sunday through Friday, 8:30 AM to 2:30 PM.106 Privileged com97
98
99
100
101
102
103

104
105

106

Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 141.
Johnson & Williams, Inside Guantanamo North, supra note 4.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3178 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540); see also Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 246–48 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Compare USP MARION, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT MAR-5267.08,
10–11 (July 5, 2012), https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mar/MAR_visit_hours.pdf,
and FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT THX-5267.08E, 5–6 (Apr. 15,
2014), http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/thp/THX_visit_hours.pdf, with Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3178. See also Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 247 (explaining that
BOP permits longer visitation and phone calls than the minimum established in the final rule).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 247
Id.; FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT THX-5267.08E, 2 (Apr. 15, 2014),
http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/thp/THX_visit_hours.pdf; USP MARION, FED.
BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT MAR-5267.08, 2 (July 5, 2012),
https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mar/MAR_visit_hours.pdf.
Id.; UPS MARION, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT MAR-5267.08, 10–
11 (July 5, 2012).
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munications between inmates’ and their attorneys are also subject to some
restrictions, but are not monitored.107 Besides these unmonitored attorney
calls, “CMU inmates can telephone only immediate family members, and
the calls are monitored, [and] . . . telephonic communication can be limited
to no more than three fifteen-minute calls per month, but BOP currently
allows inmates two fifteen-minute calls per week.”108 In other words, the
Final Rule empowers wardens to increase CMU restrictions even further
and without need for justification.109
As previously mentioned, CMU inmates tend to be classified at lower
security levels; many have few, if any, disciplinary violations.110 According
to former CMU inmate Daniel McGowan111 (who had no disciplinary violations),112 before he was transferred to the CMU, he had up to fifty-six
hours of contact visits available per month, as opposed to eight in the
CMU, and 300 minutes per month to make phone calls, in contrast to sixty
in the CMU.113 He also noted that the limited phone schedule at the CMU
formed a new challenge for his working spouse; before his transfer, he had
nearly any-time access to phones and could call her often.114
In summarizing the Final Rule, the Bureau explained that the restrictions promulgated “represent a ‘floor’ beneath which communications

107

108
109

110
111

112
113
114

Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3172 (“Unmonitored privileged telephone
communication with the inmate’s attorney is permitted as necessary in furtherance of litigation,
after establishing that communication with the verified attorney by confidential correspondence
or visiting, or monitored telephone use, is not adequate due to an urgent or impending deadline.”).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 247 (citations omitted); see also Thompson, supra note 48.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3178 (noting, for example, that written
correspondence is subject to staff inspection and may be limited to a single letter consisting of six
pieces of paper, once per week, to and from a single recipient and that all visits may be monitored and recorded); Thompson, supra note 48 (reporting that the new policy is “more limiting
than what inmates currently receive”).
Beata, supra note 17, at 297 (“many CMU detainees are not high-risk prisoners while others have
never been disciplined for behavioral violations”)
Daniel McGowan is an environmental activist associated with the Earth Liberation Front who
has written extensively about his time in CMUs. See Daniel McGowan, Court Documents Prove I
Was Sent to Communications Management Units (CMU) for My Political Speech, HUFFINGTON POST
(Apr. 1, 2013, 8:36 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/daniel-mcgowan/communicationmanagement-units_b_2944580.html; Daniel McGowan, Tales from Inside the U.S. Gitmo,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2009, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/danielmcgowan/tales-from-inside-the-us_b_212632.html. McGowan pled guilty to “conspiracy and
two counts of arson” and was sentenced to seven years in prison in November 2006. Aref II, 953
F. Supp. 2d 133, 141 (D.D.C. 2013). The court dismissed McGowan from the Aref case in 2013
because he was “released altogether from BOP custody.” Id. at 141, 144.
Anna Merian, Daniel McGowan: The FBI’s Least Wanted, THE VILLAGE VOICE (Sept. 25, 2013,
4:00 AM), http://www.villagevoice.com/news/daniel-mcgowan-the-fbis-least-wanted-6439605.
Daniel McGowan, Tales from Inside the U.S. Gitmo, supra note 111.
Id.
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cannot be further restricted.”115 Though the Bureau officially refers to the
CMUs as general population units, it also emphasizes that CMU inmates
must be wholly segregated from general population inmates.116 Like general population inmates, CMU inmates are permitted access to customary
inmate activities, such as recreation, religious services, and education programming,117 but the extremely restrictive communications limitations and
complete monitoring are unique.118 Moreover, a physical barrier separates
inmates from visitors, preventing inmates from touching their partners and
children and permitting conversation only by phone through thick glass.119
D. Conditions of Confinement: How Do CMUs Compare to Other Federal Prison
Units?
There are versions of incarceration within the federal prison system that
are more broadly restrictive than CMUs. In a review of the Bureau’s monitoring and evaluation of segregated housing, the GAO described “three main
types of segregated housing units” including Special Management Units, Secure Housing Units (commonly referred to as “the SHU”), and the Administrative Maximum facility; it included CMUs in its assessment because CMU
inmates are segregated from other prisoners and subject to more restrictions
than inmates in general population units.120 Nonetheless, as both the district
court and D.C. Circuit noted, conditions in the CMUs do not “approach the
restrictions imposed on inmates in administrative detention.”121
Generally speaking, in the Bureau’s segregated housing units, inmates
may be sequestered in their cells for up to 23 hours per day.122 In almost all
115
116

117
118
119
120

121
122

Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3168 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540)
UPS MARION, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, INSTITUTION SUPPLEMENT MAR-5267.08, 11 (July
5, 2012), http://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/mar/MAR_visit_hours.pdf (“However,
every precaution shall be made to maintain separation of CMU inmates and general population
inmates. At no time shall a CMU inmate and general population inmate use the restroom facilities or be in the search room at the same time.” (emphasis omitted)).
Id.
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 40.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 3173.
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that according to Bureau policy, “all three types of segregated housing units have the same purpose, which is to separate inmates from the general inmates population to protect the safety, security, and orderly operation of BOP facilities, and to
protect the public”).
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621 at *21 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015); see also Aref IV,
833 F.3d 242, 256 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
The terminology used to describe segregated or restrictive housing units varies across jurisdictions
and can be confusing even within the federal system. Different terms sometimes do refer to
slightly different conditions and settings. Nonetheless, all of these units fit the definition of solitary confinement provided by the United Nations: “the physical and social isolation of individuals . . . confined to cells for 22 to 24 hours a day.” Solitary confinement goes by many other
names, though, including “‘segregation’, ‘isolation’, ‘separation’, ‘cellular’, ‘lockdown’, ‘Super-
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cases, inmates designated to one of these units must be afforded a hearing
where they are permitted to present documentary evidence, call witnesses,
and receive assistance from a staff representative.123 There is an important
exception to the hearing requirement, however. Placement in a SHU can
either be disciplinary, for “inmates who violate rules,” or administrative, for
“[i]nmates who are pending security classification,” in which case placement
is “intended to be temporary and nonpunitive.”124 In the latter circumstance,
where placement is administrative, inmates are not provided a hearing.125
The GAO mentions a fourth condition, called the Special Administrative Measures or SAMs, only briefly.126 The Department of Justice explains
that “the Attorney General may direct the [Bureau] to initiate [SAMs] with
respect to a particular inmate . . . when there is a substantial risk that a
prisoner’s communications or contacts with persons could result in death or
serious bodily injury to persons.”127 Under SAMs, inmates are held “in isolated confinement” and even attorney-client communications may be monitored, where there is “reasonable suspicion . . . to believe that a particular
inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to further or
facilitate acts of terrorism.”128 As of 2013, only thirty inmates were subject
to SAMs out of a federal prison population of about 217,000 inmates.129
The Bureau differentiates CMU designation from SAMs by explaining
there are circumstances where “information indicates a similar need to impose communication restrictions,” but evidence does not indicate the “same
degree of potential risk to national security or acts of violence or terrorism
which would warrant the Attorney General’s intervention through a
SAM.”130 As such, CMUs may “create an alternative to SAMs, enabling . . . substantial communication restrictions in cases where the evidence does not warrant the imposition of a SAM.”131

123
124
125
126
127

128
129

130
131

max’, ‘the hole’ or ‘Secure Housing Unit.’” Juan E. Méndez (Special Rapporteur of the Human
Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment),
Interim Rep. on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Doc.
A/66/268, 8–10 (Aug. 5, 2011).
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 7, 9.
Id. at 7.
Id.
Id. at 9–10.
Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Prosecuting and Detaining Terror Suspects in the
U.S. Criminal Justice System (June 9, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheetprosecuting-and-detaining-terror-suspects-us-criminal-justice-system.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 57 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)).
GAO Report, supra note 12, at 1, 9. As of Aug. 20, 2015, the Bureau reports that there are about
206,860 federal inmates. Population Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (Aug. 20, 2015),
http://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/population_statistics.jsp.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3176 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540).
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 57.
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Yet the level of evidence required seems insufficient to subject CMU
inmates to indefinite restrictive confinement far from their families and
communities. In contrast to other segregated inmates, they receive only
“written notice of their reason for placement, conditions of confinement,
and their procedural protection rights.”132 This constitutes a bare minimum of procedural protection.
Ultimately, placement in any of these settings is unenviable. The guarantee of a hearing cannot guarantee actual protection against wrongful isolation; procedural protection does not ensure substantive protection. But
inmates designated to CMUs are subject to a highly restrictive environment
without concomitant procedural protection.
II. UNDERSTANDING JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
LITIGATION
The Supreme Court first held in 1964 that state prisoners could sue in
federal court for violation of their constitutional rights under section
1983.133 Even at that time, however, the Court “took pains to emphasize
the need for restraint” in the prison context and developed a strong doctrine of deference to prison officials.134 Sharon Dolovich135 has suggested
that in prisoners’ rights cases, meaningful constitutional enforcement has
taken a back seat to judicial deference to prison administrators.136
Dolovich identifies “at least three main functions” that judicial deference has evolved to serve in prison litigation.137 First, it “informs the construction of substantive constitutional doctrine,”138 meaning that “deference
to prison officials is written right into the substantive constitutional standards, yielding rules of decision that tip the scales in favor of defendants.”139
Second, deference is used to justify “altering . . . procedural rules”140 to
transform “familiar aspects of the legal process” into more “defendantfriendly procedural mechanisms.”141 Third, deference also frames “the interpretation and assessment of relevant facts,”142 which may result in “the

132
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GAO Report, supra note 12, at 53.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
Sharon Dolovich, Prison Litigation Reform Act: Forms of Deference in Prison Law, 24 FED. SENT’G R.
245, 245 (2012).
Sharon Dolovich is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Los Angeles, School of
Law.
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 245.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 245.
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recasting of a procedural or factual history,”143 in ways that “deny or disregard the lived experiences of prisoners, thereby undermining the force of
the constitutional claim at issue.”144
All three of these deferential functions are visible in the ongoing Aref
case. In Aref I, for example, the plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim was
dismissed because “the weight of the relevant case law supports the conclusion that the types of communications restrictions imposed by the CMUs are
rationally related to the legitimate penological interest of promoting the safety of correctional institutions and the public.”145 This accords with Turner v.
Safley,146 which unequivocally stated, “when a prison regulation impinges on
inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to
legitimate penological interests.”147 In other words, courts limit their substantive interpretation of constitutional rights when prison officials can show
that a practice or rule “facilitates the running of the prison.”148 As the Supreme Court has explained, to subject “the day-to-day judgments of prison
officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny analysis would seriously hamper their
ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to
the intractable problems of prison administration.”149
Understanding Turner v. Safley is essential to understanding the outcome
of most prisoners’ rights litigation. The holding is “itself deferential,” but
the Court’s description of Turner’s four factors reveals just how deferential
the standard actually is.150 First, “there must be ‘a valid, rational connection’ between the prison regulation and the government interest put forward to justify it.”151 Put another way, a challenged regulation and its asserted goals must not be “so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or
irrational.”152 Second, courts should consider whether prison inmates are
still able to exercise the asserted right through alternative means, and where
“other avenues remain available . . . courts should be particularly conscious
of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials . . . in
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Id. at 246.
Id. at 248.
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 163 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586
(1984); Williams v. Mierzejewski, 401 F. App’x 142, 145 (7th Cir. 2010); Maze v. Tafolla, 369 F.
App’x 532, 535 (5th Cir. 2010); Stojanovic v. Humphreys, 309 F. App’x 48, 51 (7th Cir. 2009);
Perez v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 229 F. App’x 55, 57 (3rd Cir. 2007); Pope v. Hightower, 101
F.3d 1382, 1385 (11th Cir. 1996); Searcy v. United States, 668 F. Supp. 2d 113, 122 (D.D.C.
2009); Arney v. Simmons, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1293 (D. Kan. 1998)).
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
Id. at 89 (emphasis added).
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 246.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 246.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 (citing Block, 468 U.S. at 586).
Id. at 89–90.
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gauging the validity of the regulation.”153 The third factor assesses the
“impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally.”154 In particular, the Court explains that if an accommodation “will
have a significant ‘ripple effect’ on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts
should be particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections
officials.”155 Fourth, “the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the
reasonableness of a prison regulation.”156 And finally, the Court cautions,
this “is not a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test: prison officials do not have to
set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional complaint.”157 Predictably, the
resulting doctrine is profoundly deferential to the judgment of prison officials—the defendants—in prisoners’ rights cases.158 It is hardly surprising
that the Aref plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim was dismissed outright.
Because the opinions in Aref have relied almost exclusively on precedent
and no novel procedural shifts have been made, the second form of deference is present but less obvious. This is because Turner’s precedential force
has already shifted some of the procedural ground. For example, a summary judgment motion generally requires the moving party show that no
triable issue of material fact exists even when “taking the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.”159 But in Turner cases, the
Court has found it possible to give “‘too little deference’ to the judgment of
prison officials.”160 Even while drawing “all justifiable inferences in [the
plaintiff’s] favor,” a plurality of the Court explained that courts still “must
distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional judgment,” and that with “respect to the latter, our inferences
must accord deference to the views of prison authorities.”161 In each of the153
154
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158
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Id. at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc.,
433 U.S. 119, 131 (1977) and Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. (citing Block, 468 U.S. at 587).
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90–91.
Dolovich summarizes the Turner test this way:
“In short, having plainly instructed lower courts that they must be deferential in assessing
alternatives (factor 2) and that any change to a prison regime will necessarily have ramifications for the institution (factor 3), the Turner Court made clear that, unless the challenged policy is found to be an ‘arbitrary or irrational’ method for the state to achieve its
stated goals (factor 1) and claimants can identify an alternative means to ‘fully accommodate’ their rights without any appreciable cost to the prison (factor 4), the challenged regulation is to be upheld. And sure enough, it is a rare case decided under Turner in which
the plaintiff ultimately prevails.”
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 246.
Id. at 248.
Id. at 248 (citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 535 (2006) (plurality opinion)).
Beard, 548 U.S. at 529–30 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) and Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003)).
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se decisions, the Court held for the defendants, relying on their view of the
facts, despite significant evidence supporting the plaintiffs’ view of the facts.
The third form of deference works to whitewash prisoners’ experiences
by essentially yielding to factual accounts provided by prison officials over
those experienced by prisoners.162 Dolovich cites a series of examples to illustrate this, including challenges to “the practice of double-celling (that is,
housing two men in sixty-three-square-foot cells originally intended for one
person),”163 use of force by a correctional officer,164 a “two-year ban on visitors for Michigan inmates who had two or more substance abuse infractions,”165 and “inadequate legal research facilities.”166 In each of these decisions, the Court held for the defendants despite significant evidence
supporting the plaintiffs’ view of the facts.167
In Aref, the plaintiffs168 originally alleged violations of their procedural
and substantive due process rights and First Amendment rights to “family
integrity,” as well as violations of the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel
and unusual punishment and the First and Fifth Amendment’s prohibition
on discrimination on the basis of religion.169 Several plaintiffs also alleged
that they “were transferred into the CMU in retaliation for their litigation
against [the Bureau].”170 By the time of Aref III, only two issues remained
before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment—Aref and
Jayyousi’s procedural due process claims and Jayyousi’s retaliation claim.171
162

163
164
165
166
167

168

169
170

171

Dolovich, supra note 134, at 249 (“[I]n its quest to reach the desired result, the Court simply pretends that the facts as it frames them require the stipulated outcome, reasoning in ways that not
only favor defendants but also seem willfully to deny the lived experience of prisoners—even
when the nature of that experience is the gravamen of the legal complaint.”).
Id. at 248 (citing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 348 (1981) (rejecting the challenge because double-celling did not “create other conditions intolerable for prison confinement”)).
Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 317–18 (1986) (comparing the views of the majority
and dissent regarding how to assess facts in the context of a directed verdict)).
Id. (citing Overton, 539 U.S. at 135 (holding that there need only be sufficient alternative means of
communication)).
Id. at 248–49 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 343 (1996)).
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 248 (noting that “the great weight of the evidence indicated that ‘a
long-term inmate must have to himself’ a minimum of fifty square feet of floor space ‘in order to
avoid serious mental, emotional, and physical deterioration’”) (citing Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 371
(Marshall, J., dissenting)).
In the beginning of the suit, there were seven plaintiffs: Yassin Muhiddin Aref, Avon Twitty, also
known as Abdul Ali, Daniel McGowan, Jenny Synan, Royal Jones, Kifah Jayyousi, Hedaya
Jayyousi. Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 154–56 (D.D.C. 2011). Jenny Synan and Hedaya Jayyousi
are married to Daniel McGowan and Kifah Jayyousi, respectively.
Id. at 156-57.
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015). All but two of
these claims—those alleging procedural due process violations and retaliation—were dismissed in
Aref I. 774 F. Supp. 2d. at 161–71.
Aref III, 2015 WL 3749621, at *11 (“Having considered the parties’ arguments, the relevant case
law, and the entire record, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to establish that designation
to the CMU is an ‘atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life.’ . . . As such, their Procedural Due Process claim fails. Further, the Court finds that
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As a result, the same court discusses these two claims once on a motion to
dismiss and again on a motion for summary judgment. In Aref IV, the D.C.
Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the procedural due process
claims and affirmed dismissal of the retaliation claim.172 The varying discussions of these claims are illustrative.
Consider first Jayyousi’s retaliation claim. In Aref II, the court discussed
the facts and concluded, “As transcribed, Jayyousi’s speech does not obviously ‘confront institutional authority’.”173 The court then briefly excerpted
portions of the defendant’s description of the speech,174 concluding that one
“interpretation of a large portion of the sermon as transcribed is that it is
dedicated to an inspirational comparison with U.S. government officials
John McCain and Jim Scotsdale, as well as Nelson Mandela.”175 At bottom, however, the court notes that “[d]efendants may well have actually
been motivated by legitimate penological goals” and that the plaintiff in a
retaliation case bears the “burden of proving the pertinent motive.”176
By contrast at the summary judgment stage, the court wrote,
Plaintiffs invite the Court to substitute its judgment for that of prison administrators in determining what constitutes a security risk warranting continued CMU monitoring. This the Court will not do. Smith wrote a lengthy
memorandum detailing the portions of Jayyousi’s speech that he found to be
‘aimed at inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population’ in the CMU
at Terra Haute. . . . Smith expressed concern about Jayyousi’s statement that
Muslim inmates had been placed in the CMU not because of any action they
had taken but simply because they were Muslim. . . . Smith also was concerned
about Jayyousi’s statements regarding ‘why we martyr.’ . . . Smith also discussed the offense for which Jayyousi had been convicted, namely, conspiracy

172
173
174

175
176

Plaintiff Jayyousi has failed to establish that his conduct was protected by the First Amendment
and, as such, his retaliation claim fails.”). Daniel McGowan was documented as a plaintiff in Aref
III, but the court explains that his claims were dismissed as moot on July 12, 2013 “because of his
release from BOP custody.” Id. at *3.
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 268–69 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Aref II, 953 F. Supp. 2d 133, 146 (D.D.C. 2013) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Freeman v. Tex. Dept. of Crim. Just., 369 F.2d 854, 864 (5th Cir. 2004)).
Id. at 146 (“Defendant Smith stated that the sermon ‘made statements which were aimed at inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population,’ ‘elicit[ing] violence, terrorism or intimidation’ and ‘disrespect[ing] or condemn[ing] other religious, ethnic, racial, or regional
groups.’ . . . While the sermon was arguably inflammatory, it does not, on its face, advocate ‘violence, terrorism or intimidation’ or ‘disrespect or condemn other religious, ethnic, racial, or regional groups.’” (alterations in original)).
Id.
Id. at 147 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588,
600 (1998)). To establish a retaliation claim, a prisoner must show “(1) he engaged in conduct
protected under the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took some retaliatory action sufficient to
deter a person of ordinary firmness from speaking again; and (3) a causal link exists between the
exercise of a constitutional right and the adverse action taken against him.” Aref III, 2015 WL
3749621, at *9.
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to murder, kidnap, and maim in a foreign country, and conspiracy to provide
material support to terrorism.177

This reproduction of the defendant prison officials’ justification for maintaining Jayyousi’s incarceration in the CMU is equivalent to the unquestioning acceptance of the defendants’ set of facts. As discussed above, when
Jayyousi was cited with a disciplinary infraction, it was eventually dismissed
and expunged from his record,178 indicating that the Bureau’s own internal
procedures had failed to produce a record indicating Jayyousi posed any
actual threat.179 The court, however, did not engage in any inquiry at the
summary judgment stage, citing instead the need to “accord [p]rison administrators . . . wide-ranging deference.”180 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
agreed with this analysis, noting that although “the interplay between
Turner and the summary judgment standard is admittedly murky,” the Supreme Court has held that “inferences must accord deference to the views
of prison authorities.”181 After reciting the Turner factors, the court concluded, “appellants are challenging a ‘disputed matter of professional
judgment’ rather than disputed matters of fact” and affirmed the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on Jayyousi’s retaliation claim.182
The problem with invoking deference at this stage, particularly given
the relatively robust factual record, is that it suggests no limit to what prison
officials may deem appropriate without substantive basis in fact. As Justice
Stevens has explained in dissent, while it may be the case that any “deprivation of something a prisoner desires gives him added incentive to improve
his behavior,” it is a justification without a limiting principle; “if sufficient, it
would provide a ‘rational basis’ for any regulation that deprives a prisoner
of a constitutional right so long as there is at least a theoretical possibility
that the prisoner can regain the right at some future time by modifying his
behavior.”183 While Aref is not a case that necessarily depends upon the
“deprivation theory of rehabilitation,”184 CMU designation arguably rests
on a theory of behavioral modification. But this presents a problem because inmates often do not know which specific behavior they should modi177
178
179

180
181
182
183
184

Aref III, 2015 WL 3749621, at *10 (citations omitted).
Aref II, 953 F. Supp. 2d. at 139–40.
Contra Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. and Opp’n to Pls.’ Cross-Mot. for Summ. J., Aref III, Civ. Act.
No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79636, 2014 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 3422, at
*69–70 (explaining that the Discipline Hearing Officer who concluded that a “charge of encouraging a group demonstration was not supported,” was simply “not asked to address, and thus did
not assess, Mr. Smith’s separate concern that the speech was evidence of Jayyousi’s possible efforts to recruit and radicalize other inmates”).
Aref III, 2015 WL 3749621, at *10 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Hatim v. Obama, 760 F.3d 54, 59 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 259 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006)).
Id. at 261.
Beard, 548 U.S. at 546 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
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fy, beyond their offense conduct for which they have already been sentenced, imprisoned, and, for the most part, classified by the Bureau as lowor medium-security inmates.
It is irrational to subject inmates to increased restrictions and expect a
change in behavior without any semblance of documented cause and effect.
Prison officials had already determined that Jayyousi’s sermon was not a
threat and did not constitute a disciplinary infraction—to then punish him
on the basis of that sermon is senseless. Nevertheless, to the extent that
prison officials are able to justify their decisions on the grounds that they
preserve safety and are necessary to prison administration, courts will defer
to prison officials’ version of the facts and disregard underlying irrationality.
One recent case suggests the Supreme Court may occasionally push
back against prison officials’ version of the facts in especially extreme or
egregious circumstances.185 In Brown v. Plata,186 the Court upheld an order
by a panel of the Ninth Circuit requiring California “to reduce its prison
population to 137.5 percent of the rated capacity of its facilities”187 because
of the “degree of overcrowding in California’s prisons.”188 In its 184-page
opinion, the panel described grievous conditions, leading the Court to
comment: “A prison that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including
adequate medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity
and has no place in civilized society.”189 Yet given the exceptional nature
of the circumstances, and sheer number of inmates affected—all those incarcerated in California—Brown likely does not signal a shift in the Court’s
prison deference jurisprudence. The plaintiffs in Aref face hardships that
are disproportionate to their crimes and in-prison behavior, but none has
been held in “a cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own
urine, unresponsive and nearly catatonic.”190
Given the low likelihood that the political branches will legislate reasonable
bounds of acceptable prison conditions unambiguously, courts should move toward finding value in a clearer and less deferential prison law jurisprudence.191
185

186
187
188

189
190
191

Dolovich, supra note 134, at 250 (describing the Court as having shown itself “able to
acknowledge strategic behavior on the part of prison officials and to credit the lived experience of
people in prison”). Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005), discussed infra Part IV, provides another example of a plaintiff prisoner succeeding on his facts.
131 S. Ct. 1910 (2011)
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 250.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1923–24 (cataloging severe overcrowding, a lack of minimal adequate care
for the seriously mentally ill, a “shortage of treatment beds [resulting in] suicidal inmates [being]
held for prolonged periods in telephone-booth sized cages without toilets,” specific deaths resulting from delays in medical evaluation, and so on).
Id. at 1928.
Id. at 1924.
Dolovich, supra note 134, at 245 (calling for “a theory of deference for the prison law context, i.e.,
for the development of principles to guide judicial deference in prison law cases and to set appropriate limits on its use”).
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III. ASSESSING PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN CMUS
UNDER MATHEWS V. ELDRIDGE
“[I]t’s an administrative black hole.”
—Andy Stepanian, former CMU inmate192

Prisoners face long odds when asserting their rights in court. Still,
CMU inmate-plaintiffs can and should allege procedural due process violations when they are not provided a hearing. As the D.C. Circuit held in
Aref IV, prisoners have a liberty interest in avoiding transfer to a CMU,
which may occur erroneously.193 The potential impact of additional procedural safeguards is significant and the administrative burden of implementation is relatively low.
Procedural due process claims are assessed under the Mathews v. Eldridge
balancing test,194 wherein courts consider:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.195

In the prison litigation context, however, constitutional claims are more
limited. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that “prisoners do not shed
all constitutional rights at the prison gate,”196 but also admonished that
“[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation
of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations
underlying our penal system.”197 As a result, prisoners’ liberty interests are
inherently circumscribed; “the Due Process Clause does not protect every
change in the conditions of confinement having a substantial adverse impact on the prisoner.”198
With these premises in mind, the Court held in Sandin v. Conner199 that
inmates only have a liberty interest in “freedom from restraint
which . . . imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in rela192

193
194
195
196
197
198
199

Christopher S. Stewart, The Balancer: Animal-Rights Activist Andrew Stepanian Talks About His Time
Inside
‘Little
Gitmo’,
N.Y.
MAG
(July
15,
2011,
3:15
PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2011/07/little_gitmo_author_speaks_to.html.
833 F.3d 242, 257–58 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
424 U.S. 320, 334.
Id. at 335.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 485 (1995) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555
(1974)).
Id. (citing Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977)).
Id. at 478 (citing Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976)).
515 U.S. 472.
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tion to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”200 If such a liberty interest exists, then “a ‘fundamental requirement’ of due process is that an individual
receive ‘the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’”201 Indeed, in the D.C. Circuit, “the proper methodology
for evaluating deprivation claims under Sandin is to consider (i) the conditions of confinement relative to administrative segregation, (ii) the duration
of that confinement generally, and (iii) the duration relative to length of
administrative segregation routinely imposed on prisoners serving similar
sentences.”202 Administrative segregation is “a form of solitary confinement
commonly used to separate disruptive prisoners.”203 The D.C. Circuit also
emphasizes “that a liberty interest can potentially arise under less-severe
conditions when the deprivation is prolonged or indefinite.”204
For CMU inmates, their potential liberty interest lies “in avoiding an erroneous designation to a CMU.”205 In the Aref cases, plaintiffs survived an
initial motion to dismiss their procedural due process claim,206 lost at the
summary judgment stage in the district court,207 and then won reversal on
appeal albeit with some skepticism.208 The court in Aref I explained, “it is
plausible that the conditions of confinement in the CMUs constitute an
atypical and significant hardship on the plaintiffs”209 because there may be
“a significant disparity in the treatment of CMU inmates and those housed
in the general population.”210 The Bureau argued “restrictions in the CMU
are no harsher than those found in solitary confinement,” but the court
pointed out that the Bureau failed to address “whether prisoners with similar
sentences are routinely placed in solitary confinement.”211 In Aref III, on dueling motions for summary judgment, it became clear that some federal
prisoners at the Marion and Terre Haute facilities are subject to administrative segregation, which is far more restrictive than CMU confinement.212
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208

209
210
211
212

Id. at 484.
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 164 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976)).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 255 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see also Hatch v. Dist. of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846,
847 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Hatch, 184 F.3d at 848.
Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 255.
Beata, supra note 17, at 294.
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 163–64.
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *11 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015).
Aref IV, 833 F.3d at 258 (remanding to the district court to determine “whether the assignment
process used by the government is adequate,” but noting that “[b]ecause the cardinal principle in
due process analysis is flexibility—i.e., attention to relevant context and consideration of competing interests—only minimal process is likely due”).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 165–66.
Id. at 165.
Id.
Aref III, 2015 WL 3749621, at *5–6. Plaintiffs also argued that the average inmates’ duration of confinement in the CMUs was much longer than the average inmates’ stay in administrative segrega-
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Accordingly, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had no protected liberty interest in avoiding CMU designation.213 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
found three factors were significant when it reversed the district court.214
CMU designation, the panel explained, “is exercised selectively; the duration is indefinite and could be permanent; the deprivations—while not extreme—necessarily increase in severity over time . . . as children grow older
and relationships with the outside become more difficult to maintain.”215
But the D.C. Circuit also predicted that, “only minimal process is likely
due.”216 Given current jurisprudence, this prediction is unsurprising.
Sandin did not produce “consistent conclusions for identifying the baseline from which to measure what is atypical and significant in any particular prison system.”217 Particularly in light of Wilkinson v. Austin,218 judges
may be unimpressed by the stark implications of imposing needless restrictions on inmates and may feel that the judiciary should not involve itself in protecting substantive rights except in the most extreme cases. But
this is a failure to recognize the role of the judiciary in serving as a last line
of defense for the rights of a group society finds all too easy to despise.
The second Mathews factor requires assessing available procedure;219 in
this case, inmates transferred to CMUs are notified of the reason for their

213
214
215
216
217

218

219

tion such that even though CMUs are comparatively less restrictive than administrative segregation,
CMU restrictions become increasingly onerous over time, eventually constituting the required atypical and significant hardship. The court did not find this argument persuasive. Id. at *7–8.
Id. at *8.
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 257 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Id.
Id. at 258.
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 223 (2005) (citing Hatch v. Dist. of Columbia, 184 F.3d 846,
847 (D.C. Cir. 1999), among others) (noting further, “We need not resolve the issue here, however, for we are satisfied that assignment to OSP [Ohio State Penitentiary] imposes an atypical and
significant hardship under any plausible baseline.”).
In Wilkinson, the Supreme Court upheld a district court finding that inmates had a liberty interest
in avoiding designation to the Ohio State Penitentiary, which it described as prohibiting “almost
all human contact . . . even to the point that conversation is not permitted from cell to cell; the
light, though it may be dimmed, is on 24 hours; exercise is for 1 hour per day, but only in a small
indoor room.” Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223–24. Justice Kennedy then explained that “these conditions likely would apply to most solitary confinement facilities,” suggesting that perhaps with
those attributes alone the facility would not impose a sufficiently atypical and significant hardship
to create a liberty interest. Id. at 224. But because placement was also indefinite and, “after an
initial 30-day review . . . [was] reviewed just annually,” and because the placement “disqualifies
an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration,” the setting did impose “an atypical and
significant hardship within the correctional context.” Id. In fact, as recently as April 2015, prisoners in Ohio’s supermax, another name for the Ohio State Penitentiary in Youngstown, went
on a month-long hunger strike “to protest new restrictions placed on already severely limited recreation and programming for those in solitary confinement.” Vaidya Gullapalli, At Ohio’s Supermax Prison, a Hunger Strike Ends But Extreme Isolation Remains, SOLITARY WATCH (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://solitarywatch.com/2015/04/21/at-ohios-supermax-prison-a-hunger-strike-ends-butextreme-isolation-remains/.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3178 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540). The Final Rule’s description of this procedure does not differ notably from
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transfer in a short paragraph delivered to them on a one-page form after arriving in the CMU.220 To challenge the CMU designation, inmates can only file “an administrative appeal through [the Bureau’s] Administrative
Remedy Program,” which provides “a purely written process.”221
Manifold problems are contained in this procedure. First, notice is provided post-transfer, preventing inmates from being able to timely notify
lawyers and only permitting a correction after the transfer has already occurred.222 This is especially troubling because it provides an administrative
and financial incentive not to correct errors,223 particularly those that may
only be brought to light by the inmate himself. Moreover, the explanation
provided to justify transfers is often vague, giving prison officials nearly
complete discretion.224 Some former CMU inmates have suggested that
discretion is used to punish inmates who express unpopular political ideas
while in prison.225 In Aref I, plaintiff Royal Jones226 survived a motion to
dismiss on the allegation that he was transferred in retaliation for making
frequent use of procedures to complain internally and for pursuing formal
litigation against the Bureau.227 The district court explained that given his
“relatively clean disciplinary history, his history of complaints and the
threat allegedly directed at him by staff at [another Bureau prison], Jones
[had] plausibly alleged that he was transferred to the CMU in retaliation
for his continued litigation against [the Bureau].”228 It is difficult to know

220

221
222
223
224
225

226

227
228

those described by media and scholarly accounts of CMU designation. Beata, supra note 17, at
296; Malek, supra note 7; Shapiro, supra note 1, at 60–61.
Shapiro, supra note 1, at 60–61 (“A fairly typical Notice of Transfer states: ‘Your current offenses
of conviction include Providing Material Support & Resources to a Foreign Terrorist Organization, & Conspiracy to Use a Weapon of Mass Destruction. Your offense conduct included significant communication, association and assistance to Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a group which has
been designated as a foreign terrorist organization.’”).
Id. at 61 (describing the Administrative Remedy Program as generally being used by inmates to
submit complaints and appeal rejections “through the chain of command”).
See Beata, supra note 17, at 296 (describing a CMU designation as “fait accompli”).
Id.
Id.
Amy Goodman, EXCLUSIVE: Animal Rights Activist Jailed at Secretive Prison Gives First Account of Life
Inside a “CMU”, DEMOCRACY NOW! (June 25, 2009), https://www.democracynow.org/2009/6/25/exclusive_animal_rights_activist_jailed_at; McGowan, Court Documents Prove I Was
Sent to Communications Management Units (CMU) for My Political Speech, supra note 111. Others have
theorized similar motives behind their transfers. Malek, supra note 7; Stewart, supra note 5.
Royal Jones was a plaintiff in Aref I who was “convicted of solicitation of bank robbery, which
also constituted a probation violation for an earlier gun possession conviction. . . . He was sentenced in 2007 to ninety-four months of incarceration.” Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 155 (D.D.C.
2011). He had “‘no serious disciplinary infractions’ and only ‘one minor communications []related infraction’ during this period of incarceration.” Id. (alteration in original). Jones was
originally party to the amended complaint in Aref II, but the court “dismissed him from the case
on May 1, 2013 for failing to comply with the Court’s Order or otherwise prosecute his case.”
Aref II, 953 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138 n.1 (D.D.C. 2013).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 169.
Id.
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whether this type of retaliation is common given the breadth of prison officials’ discretion and the dearth of visible administrative process when inmates are designated to CMUs.229
The Bureau argues that the current administrative system of appeals
provides sufficient due process,230 but prisoners have “no right to a live hearing, no right to call witnesses, and no right to representation by a staff member.”231 These are procedures generally provided when inmates are placed
in restrictive settings for disciplinary or punitive reasons.232 Given that the
total inmate population in restrictive segregated housing was about 12,460
in 2013,233 the burden on the Bureau to provide these basic procedures to
about eighty additional inmates would be negligible. Although the D.C.
Circuit pointed out that the Aref plaintiffs “are challenging fundamentally
predictive judgments in an area where administrators are given broad discretion and the government’s legitimate interests in maintaining CMUs
must be accorded substantial weight,”234 the district court should not be
cowed into permitting Bureau officials to carry on without any semblance of
oversight. Prevention of erroneous designation is important for individual
inmates, but it also gives a greater appearance of fairness more broadly, and
the shoring up of public faith in just institutions is itself a worthwhile goal.
The last Mathews factor considers the government interest, which in this
case centers on maintaining safety and order in the prison context. Courts
have called this a “dominant consideration.”235 Given the prison system’s
“attendant curtailment of liberties,” the extent to which prisoners may demand procedural protections by right is inherently reduced.236 Even where
prisoners are able to successfully allege a liberty interest, this factor raises
up a second significant hurdle in the quest for robust procedural due process.237 According to the Court, this is because prison administrators’ “first

229

230

231

232
233
234
235
236
237

Both Daniel McGowan, discussed supra note 111, and Kifah Jayyousi, discussed supra Part I.B.,
alleged that they were transferred to the CMUs in retaliation for their protected political and religious speech.
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3170 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540) (“Even assuming that inmates have a liberty interest in this context, inmates
have been afforded sufficient process and will continue to be afforded . . . post-placement due
process in the form of written notice under § 540.202(c) upon arrival.”).
Beata, supra note 17, at 296 (citing Letter from David Shapiro, Counsel, Brennan Ctr. for Justice,
to Sarah Qureshi, Office of Gen. Counsel, Bureau of Prisons (June 2, 2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/CMU_letter/).
See GAO Report, supra note 12, at 7, 9 (comparing segregated housing unit policies).
Id. at 14.
Aref IV, 833 F.3d 242, 258 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 227 (2005).
Id. at 211.
See Dolovich, supra note 134, at 246 (describing the holding in Turner as doubly deferential; both
the holding in the case, which permits prison officials to “violate constitutional rights if they can
show that doing so facilitates the running of the prison,” and the four-factor rule arising from it,
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obligation must be to ensure the safety of guards and prison personnel, the
public, and the prisoners themselves.”238 To illustrate the danger, the
Court invokes “the brutal reality of prison gangs . . . committed to fear and
violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals,”
and emphasizes the risk of testifying against gang activities.239 Moreover,
prison officials face the “problem of scarce resources,” and given that more
restrictive confinement costs more, it is possible to assume that any “penal
system, faced with costs like these will find it difficult to fund more effective
education and vocational assistance programs.”240 Accordingly, “courts
must give substantial deference to prison management decisions before
mandating additional expenditures for elaborate procedural safeguards
when correctional officials conclude that a prisoner has engaged in disruptive behavior.”241 The result is that although the Court recognizes the
plaintiffs’ liberty interest, it finds that the state’s new policy “is adequate to
safeguard” that interest.242
The chief complaint about CMUs is the lack of procedural due process
in designation because it means a lack of protection from error and prejudice.243 Before being transferred to the Bureau’s Administrative Maximum
facility, inmates receive advance notice and “a pre-transfer hearing during
which they can present evidence and call witnesses on their behalf.”244 As
the lead counsel in the ongoing Aref suit has put it, CMU designation criteria are drawn broadly and without “robust processes for prisoners to protest,” creating “a situation that’s ripe for abuse.”245
The promulgation of the Final Rule with few substantive changes is
troubling because the Proposed Rules were so roundly criticized over the
course of roughly nine years.246 Moreover, alternative procedural safe-
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which requires only a rational connection between the prison regulation and the government interest, ensure a defendant-friendly slant).
Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 227.
Id.
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
See Shapiro, supra note 1, at 89 (describing the lack of meaningful procedural protections associated with CMU designation). See also Beata, supra note 17, at 291–98 (noting that the “lack of notice
implicates the potential for arbitrary decision-making and precludes the inmate from preparing
an adequate basis for objection”).
Thompson, supra note 48.
See id. (“When you draw your designation criteria so broadly and you don’t have robust processes
for prisoners to protest, you create a situation that’s ripe for abuse.”).
Agathocleous, supra note 58 (writing that the Bureau was “flooded with criticism during a public
comment period about the units” and asserting that the new rule “does nothing to change, correct, or enhance the process by which prisoners are singled out for CMU designation”).
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guards are feasible.247 Given the small CMU population—fewer than 100
at any given time248—providing advance notice would have a minimal impact on resources nationally. The Bureau professes to believe that even the
strictest forms of restricted communication are discretionary and unreviewable.249 That perspective does not comply with the Bureau’s own policy of
encouraging the maintenance of family connections250 and fails to comprehend the dramatic nature of the restrictions imposed on CMU inmates.251
Furthermore, the Bureau itself classifies many CMU inmates as lowsecurity prisoners and most have few or no behavioral or disciplinary violations.252 For these reasons, a brief delay to accommodate procedural safeguards is unlikely to incur much if any risk.253
IV. ASSESSING EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATIONS IN CMUS UNDER
ASHCROFT V. IQBAL
Muslim inmates make up somewhere between sixty-six and seventy-two
percent of the CMU population, and just six percent of the federal prison
population.254 The plaintiffs in Aref I argued that there was “a pattern and
practice throughout the [Bureau] of designating individuals . . . to the
CMU in retaliation for their protected political and religious speech and
247

248

249

250

251

252
253

254

See Beata, supra note 17, at 297 (“[G]iven the small size of CMUs, the costs associated with implementing additional safeguards, such as providing inmates with advance notice, would be minimal.”).
See id. (noting that the “Terra Haute CMU’s total capacity is just eighty-five prisoners,” and that
the two units only held seventy-one men as of that writing in 2012); Williams & Johnson, Five
More, supra note 68 (noting that the units can hold “a total of 100 inmates”).
See Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3170 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified
at 28 CFR pt. 540) (“Since the Constitution does not give rise to a liberty interest when the issue
is avoiding a transfer to an institution that is less favorable or more restrictive than another, inmates do not have a liberty interest that should be protected from transfer to a CMU.”).
See Stay in Touch, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, http://www.bop.gov/inmates/communications.jsp
(last visited Jan. 30, 2015) (“Studies show that when inmates maintain relationships with friends
and family, it greatly reduces the risk they will recidivate.”). See also Shapiro, supra note 1, at 85
n.180 (“With remarkable consistency, studies have shown that family contact during incarceration is associated with lower recidivism rates.”) (citing Nancy G. La Vinge et al., Examining the Effect of Incarceration and In-Prison Family Contact on Prisoner’s Family Relationships, 21 J. OF CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 314, 316 (2005)).
Aref II, 953 F. Supp. 2d. 133, 141 (D.D.C. 2013) (noting that the plaintiff alleged that “restrictions
placed on his visitation and telephone access were ‘extremely painful and onerous,’ requiring him
to ‘struggle[ ] to maintain a close relationship with his wife and children’”).
See Stewart, supra note 5 (underscoring that Aref’s lawyers describe his conduct in prison as spotless).
See McGowan, Tales from Inside the U.S. Gitmo, supra note 111 (describing the lack of due process
afforded CMU prisoners); Shapiro, supra note 1, at 84 (describing the low threat posed by some
CMU prisoners). In addition, the Bureau’s own internal procedure classified these inmates as
low security, implying that it might be reasonable to require greater justification to transfer them
far from their families and communities and to subject them to dramatic communications restrictions.
Johnson & Williams, Inside Guantanamo North, supra note 4.
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beliefs, or based on their religion, national origin, and perceived political
and/or ideological beliefs.”255 Specifically, they alleged that “Aref, Jayyousi
and Jones [were transferred] into CMUs because they are Muslim and
therefore [were] unlawfully discriminated against . . . in violation of the
First and Fifth Amendment.”256 The retaliation claims were not initially
dismissed, but the allegations of discrimination were because, as the court
explained, the “statistics . . . without more, are not minimally sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.”257
To successfully allege wrongdoing, Ashcroft v. Iqbal258 requires that plaintiffs plead facts that make their entitlement to relief plausible, not simply possible.259 In the context of equal protection, this entails both a plausible showing of unconstitutional discrimination, and a plausible showing that the
classification policy was “purposefully adopted . . . because of [the plaintiffs’]
race, religion, or national origin.”260 In Iqbal, the Court held that it might be
possible for “a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the [September 11] attacks
would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though
the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims.”261 The
relationship between Iqbal and potential challenges by prisoners being placed
in CMUs is transparent: if the Court accepts as a preliminary matter that the
Bureau only selected prisoners whose communications threaten prison stability, then moving past the pleading stage will prove nearly impossible, no matter the racial or religious makeup of those prisoners.262 Finding discriminatory purpose requires that a decision maker selected a “course of action
‘because of, not merely in spite of, [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.’”263 If more terrorist inmates in the United States are Arab or
Muslim, it follows that a greater proportion of CMU inmates will be Arab or
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Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 (D.D.C. 2011).
Id. at 170.
Id.
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
See id. at 678 (“Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of “entitlement to relief.”’”)
(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
Id. at 682 (“But even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts give rise to a plausible inference that
respondent’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would
not entitle respondent to relief.”).
Id.
See id. at 683 (noting that the plaintiff must “allege more by way of factual content to ‘nudge’ his
claim of purposeful discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). See also Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 170–71 (granting the defendant’s
motion to dismiss claims of discrimination) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (alteration in original) (citing Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney,
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)).
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Muslim.264 As a result, discovering proof of purposeful discrimination may
border on the impossible, even in circumstances where disparities between
populations appear to implicate egregious discrimination.265
So, challenging CMU designation on an equal protection basis requires
more than statistical evidence.266 And some evidence does exist that Muslims
are being designated to the CMUs because of their religion and potentially
their national origin or political beliefs.267 The experience of Andy Stepanian, a non-Muslim, non-Arab, animal rights activist who was transferred to
the CMU at Marion in June 2008, provides this evidence.268 According to
Stepanian, one prison guard said to him, “You’re nothing like these Muslims.
You’re just here for balance. You’re going to go home soon.”269 He also reported that guards sometimes referred to non-Muslim inmates generally as
“balancers.”270 These details would, on their face, suggest the type of purposeful official discrimination that Iqbal requires,271 and they were not introduced in the Aref case.272 But there are few, if any, additional documented
examples of intent.273 The Bureau claims to have articulated a “valid legiti-
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See Communication Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3168 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified
at 28 CFR pt. 540) (describing one of the significant reasons for CMU designation as involvement in terrorist-related activities and communications); Shane, supra note 61 (citing that as of
October 2011, the Bureau “reported that it was holding 362 people convicted in terrorismrelated cases”).
Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 482 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the
district court should have been entitled to take judicial notice of the fact that of the 3,500 defendants the government had charged with narcotics violations over three years, the government
could only offer eleven nonblack defendants, all of whom “were members of other racial or ethnic minorities”).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d at 170 (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1273–74 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(“explaining that ‘to be legally sufficient’ the proffered statistics must demonstrate not just a disparity of treatment, but they must ‘eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations
of the disparity, and thus permit the inference that, absent other explanation, the disparity more
likely than not resulted from illegal discrimination’”)).
McGowan, Court Documents Prove I Was Sent to Communications Management Units (CMU) for My Political Speech, supra note 111; Goodman, supra note 225.
Malek, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.; Andy Stepanian, Isolated in Federal Communication Management Units, Silenced Voices Need Ours,
HUFFINGTON POST (May 25, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andy-stepanian/isolatedin-federal-commu_b_570920.html.
Contra Club Retro, L.L.C. v. Hilton, 568 F.3d 181, 213 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the combination of statistical evidence suggesting the raid was ineffective and that the targeted Club’s patrons were mixed-race even in combination with the use of racial epithets by police officers was
not enough to show “unequal treatment or discriminatory intent on the part of” the defendants).
Aref I, 774 F. Supp. 2d 147, 170 (D.D.C. 2011).
Dhafir, supra note 39 (“I was put in isolation for 2 days before the move in what I know now was
a nationwide operation to put Muslims/Arabs in one place so that we can be closely monitored
regarding our communications”). See Press Release, Ctr. for Const. Rts., CCR, Former Corrections Officials, Large Coalition Flood BOP with Public Comments Critical of Experimental Prison Units (June 2, 2010), https://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/ccr%2C-formercorrections-officials%2C-large-coalition-flood-bop-public-comments (“Between 65 and 72 per-
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mate penological purpose” for designating inmates to CMUs “on a case-bycase basis.”274 This may not “negate[] a claim of a Bureau-wide conspiracy
to discriminate against Muslims,”275 but without more, CMU inmates are
unlikely to successfully allege an equal protection violation.
Even so, there is one example of a successful equal protection challenge
in the prisons context. In Johnson v. California,276 the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation had a practice, albeit an unwritten one,
of placing new and transferred inmates in double cells with inmates of the
same race for the first sixty days of their placement.277 As a result, prison
officials explicitly relied on race to make double-cell assignments and they
urged the Court to “apply the deferential standard of review articulated in
Turner” to evaluate the practice.278 But the Court ruled that Turner has never been applied to racial classifications.279 Moreover, “Turner’s reasonablerelationship test [is applied] only to rights that are ‘inconsistent with proper
incarceration,’” which is not the case for freedom from racial discrimination.280 Rather: “The right not to be discriminated against based on one’s
race is not susceptible to the logic of Turner.”281
Of course, Johnson differs from Aref, especially due to the involvement of
racial rather than religious bias,282 and the unwritten but express policy of
discrimination. Yet the analysis in Johnson provides a parallel to CMU inmates’ situation. The Court explains that even as “prison officials cite racial violence as the reason for their policy,” they may aggravate the problem they intend to solve.283 Indeed, “by insisting that inmates be housed
only with other inmates of the same race, it is possible that prison officials
will breed further hostility among prisoners and reinforce racial and ethnic
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cent of CMU prisoners are Muslim men, a fact that attorneys say demonstrates that the CMUs
were created to allow for the segregation and restrictive treatment of Muslims based on the discriminatory belief that such prisoners are more likely than others to pose a threat to prison security.”).
Communications Management Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 3168, 3169 (Jan. 22, 2015) (to be codified at
28 CFR pt. 540).
Id.
543 U.S. 499 (2005).
Id. at 502.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 510.
Id. (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003)).
Id. at 510.
Id. at 530–531 n.4 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342,
349–50 (1987)) (asserting that Turner has been applied to “the right of free exercise of religion under the First Amendment”). See also Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal
Protection Clause 2 (Nw. U. Sch. of Law Scholarly Commons, Paper No. 213, 2012),
http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1212&context=fac
ultyworkingpapers (explaining that “the modern Supreme Court has not recognized that the antidiscrimination command of the Fourteenth Amendment protects religion in the same way that
[it] protects against discrimination on the basis of race”).
Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507.
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divisions.”284 Segregating inmates on the basis of religion might have a similar effect, particularly when radicalization is a concern.285 But the Court
views its Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence narrowly and likely would
not make this leap in the CMU context.286 Thus, even if CMU inmates
were able to withstand a motion to dismiss under Iqbal, their allegations are
likelier assessed under the deferential Turner standard than under strict scrutiny and success is unlikely.287 And Iqbal’s heightened pleading standards
foreclose gathering persuasive information on discovery-level issues such as
the inner workings of the designation process.288 But this assumes no
change in precedent or statute.
V. REFORM IN THE POLITICAL MOMENT
In the years prior to President Trump’s election, the political climate
suggested an opportunity for actors in all three branches of government to
enact systemic reforms within prisons.289 And there may still be political
interest in prison reform. CMUs represent one egregious convergence of
the problems within criminal justice and especially within the prison system. Reform that begins with CMUs would have implications across the
Bureau, and—with any luck—across state prison systems as well.
284
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289

Id.
Aref III, No. 10-0539 (BJR), 2015 WL 3749621, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2015) (finding that
Smith’s “lengthy memorandum detailing the portions of Jayyousi’s speech that he found to be
‘aimed at inciting and radicalizing the Muslim inmate population’” along with the Bureau’s other
asserted evidence was enough to constitute “a valid, rational connection between their recommendation that Jayyousi remain in CMU and a legitimate government or penological interest”).
See Calabresi & Salander, supra note 282, at 2–3.
O’Lone, 482 U.S. at 348–49.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007)).
See, e.g., Russell Berman, A Poll-Tested Message for Criminal Justice Reform, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 18,
2016, 6:03 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/02/the-complicatedpolitics-of-criminal-justice-reform/463284/ (“Strong majorities in four purple states and Republican-leaning Kentucky and Missouri seem to agree with the premise of reform that both parties
have been promoting: Federal prisons house too many non-violent criminals, the government
spends too much money incarcerating them, the main goal of prison should be rehabilitation,
and Washington shouldn’t make it so hard for inmates to find jobs after they’re released.”). See also MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS (2010); Neil Barsky, A Letter from Our Founder, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov.
15, 2014), https://www.themarshallproject.org/about#.wMWsDlITi, (“What struck me was not
only how expensive, ineffective, and racially biased [the criminal justice system] is, and how difficult it is to find anyone, liberal or conservative, who defends the status quo. But also how our
condition has become taken for granted. Other American crises—soaring health-care costs, the
failure of public education—typically lead to public debate and legislative action. But the spike in
mass incarceration appears to have had the opposite effect: The general public has become inured to the overuse of solitary confinement, the widespread incidence of prison rape and the mixing of teens and adults in hardcore prisons. . . . The Marshall Project represents our attempt to
elevate the criminal justice issue to one of national urgency, and to help spark a national conversation about reform.”).
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In the 1820s, Quaker reformists theorized that solitude would lead “to
reflection and ultimately penitence.”290 Putting this theory into practice,
American penitentiaries placed convicts “in total isolation . . . [permitting
them] to speak with only a limited number of prison guards and a few preselected visitors.”291 In 1890, the Supreme Court described the system’s effects this way: “A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a
short confinement, into a semi-fatuous condition . . . while those who stood
the ordeal . . . in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to be
of any subsequent service to the community.”292
President Obama worked to curb the most extreme uses of solitary confinement within the federal system.293 And Justice Kennedy recently suggested that the time has come for the judiciary “to determine whether
workable alternative systems for long-term confinement exist, and, if so,
whether a correctional system should be required to adopt them.”294
Though courts are expected to exercise deferential judicial restraint in
the context of prison policy, the judiciary is in a unique position to engage
critically and thoughtfully with the policies set forth by the executive branch
through both the Bureau and the Department of Justice. The judicial role
is twofold. First, prison officials must be held to account to internal standards they set for themselves. For example, the Bureau professes to believe
that maintaining family connections while in prison is important because it
decreases the likelihood of recidivism.295 When the Bureau elects to disregard its own guidance, courts should require a substantive explanation. If
that explanation is rational and legitimate, then it will survive scrutiny.
However, courts must act as facilitators of critical dialogue, rather than deferential lackeys to prison administrators. No other actor can ensure com-

290

291
292
293

294
295

Laurel Dalrymple, At an Abandoned Philadelphia Prison, All Hell Breaks Loose, NPR (Oct. 24 2013,
2:27 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/10/24/232208198/at-an-abandoned-philadelphia-prisonall-hell-breaks-loose.
Sally Mann Romano, If the SHU Fits: Cruel and Unusual Punishment at California’s Pelican Bay State
Prison, 45 EMORY L.J. 1089, 1094 (1996).
In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
Dep’t of Justice, Report and Recommendations Concerning the Use of Restrictive Housing 94, 105–106 (Jan.
2016); Barack Obama, Barack Obama: Why We Must Rethink Solitary Confinement, THE
WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/barackobama-why-we-must-rethink-solitary-confinement/2016/01/25/29a361f2-c384-11e5-89650607e0e265ce_story.html (explaining the adoption of Justice Department recommendations to
ban “solitary confinement for juveniles and as a response to low-level infractions, expanding
treatment for the mentally ill and increasing the amount of time inmates in solitary can spend
outside of their cells”).
Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Stay in Touch, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last visited Jan. 30, 2015),
http://www.bop.gov/inmates/communications.jsp (“Studies show that when inmates maintain
relationships with friends and family, it greatly reduces the risk they will recidivate.”).
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pliance with both avowed policy and human rights tenets.296 Second, the
political branches are often unable or unwilling to engage in nuanced assessments of prison conditions and corresponding prisoners’ rights.297 Liberalizing prison policy is especially high stakes because failures may be perceived as endangering the public, causing political actors to fear
repercussions of any dramatic change.298 The result is a one-way political
ratchet. This truth should not serve as an excuse for inaction on the part of
those actors, but should provoke the Court into playing its role in protecting the constitutional rights of prisoners.
Prison officials are in a difficult position, but cannot be exempted from
the strictures of the Constitution. Somewhat like climate change denial, the
continued use of highly restrictive settings either to rehabilitate or to increase
safety is (usually) politically attractive299 and scientifically disproven as an effective method of rehabilitation or preserving safety.300 Prison administrators
do face an intractable problem of prison administration, but courts should
not abandon them to navigate this problem without the benefit of oversight.
CONCLUSION
Although CMU conditions are less severe than many forms of restrictive
housing, reforming the most restrictive forms of confinement routinely
available in the prison system should shift the analysis of CMU conditions
under Sandin v. Conner. One problem, though, is that Sandin itself fails to
comprehend the nature of prison administration that is created when pris-
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A president could choose to facilitate greater, faster change in the Bureau through an executive
order requiring specified protections and procedures for prisoners transferred to more restrictive
conditions.
See Rachel Lyon, Media, Race, Crime, and Punishment: Re-Framing Stereotypes in Crime and Human Rights
Issues, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 741, 742 (2009) (noting that “media function[s] as mediators of meanings, powerfully shaping the ways in which people understand our world by organizing information [such that viewers form] perceptions about good and bad over time”). But see Obama, supra note 293 (demonstrating President Obama’s direct criticism of solitary confinement).
Senators Criticize Bush Administration’s Failure to Monitor Communications of Deadly Terrorists in U.S. Custody, U.S. SENATE DEMOCRATS (Oct. 4, 2006, 8:00 AM), http://democrats.senate.gov/2006/10/04/senators-criticize-bush-administrations-failure-to-monitor-communications-of-deadlyterrorists-in-u-s-custody/#.VNfTc1PF-4J; contra Berman, supra note 289 (noting that the “chief
goal” of the pollsters is “to persuade Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell that bringing up
a bipartisan bill [to pass criminal-justice reform] will not jeopardize the GOP majority this fall”);
Burke Butler et al., A Solitary Failure: The Waste, Cost and Harm of Solitary Confinement in Texas, AM.
C.L. UNION OF TEX. 8 (Feb. 5, 2015); .
Brian Mann, How Solitary Confinement Became Hardwired in U.S. Prisons, NPR (Aug. 23, 2015, 7:58
AM) (“In all, a dozen states are looking to reform the way they use solitary confinement. But
here’s a sign of how hard it might be to shift away from long-term isolation in American prisons:
As President Obama condemned the use [of] solitary confinement last month, his administration
is finishing construction of a new $200 million Supermax correctional facility in Illinois. Its hundreds of isolation cells are expected to begin holding inmates next year.”).
Butler, supra note 298, at 10.
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oners cannot challenge unduly harsh conditions imposed without explanation. It is irrational, and as criminal defense attorneys have long argued,
people society considers dangerous “are the last ones in whom to reinforce
values that disregard the worth of other human beings.”301 Prisoners subject to the extreme forms of deprivation at issue in Brown v. Plata and Wilkinson v. Austin absolutely require protection. All prisoners do. Prison officials are not the only actors capable of determining proportionate
punishment and, in fact, some check on their exercise of discretion is both
beneficial and essential to a more appropriately punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative prison system.
CMU inmates—like most prisoners—are not the most appealing plaintiffs. Many have actually been convicted of having terrorist associations.
But none of them, including Yassin Aref and Kifah Jayyousi, should have
been transferred thousands of miles from their families without notice or
justification. If the political branches do not have the will to remedy this
injustice, the judiciary should.
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